Idk who leads the Netherlands but i would say themweak bait
George Washington and Abraham Lincoln for sure, such plebs.
Dunno, those were the first two prominent Americans that came to mind. Could have named some generals from the ACW but meh.George Washington and Abraham Lincoln for sure, such plebs.
I'd agree with Washington, but Abraham Lincoln?
Definitely George Washington and HitlerHitler is overrated?
guys lets not focus on American generals too much and keep things related to Europe
I'd say William I, Prince of Orange.
weak bait
guys lets not focus on American generals too much and keep things related to Europe
I'd say William I, Prince of Orange.
Countries > Empires
Duuring
Countries > Empires
England no longer exists
guys lets not focus on American generals too much and keep things related to Europe
I'd say William I, Prince of Orange.
Incorrect title. It's either 'The Prince of Orange' or 'William I, Soevereign Ruler/King of the United Netherlands/King of the Netherlands'.
guys lets not focus on American generals too much and keep things related to Europe
I'd say William I, Prince of Orange.
Incorrect title. It's either 'The Prince of Orange' or 'William I, Soevereign Ruler/King of the United Netherlands/King of the Netherlands'.
You're wrong he was both King William I, and Prince of Orange. If we were alive in 1815 then you'd be right but from a strictly historical point of view you can call him both. It's like saying General, President De Gaulle
I'd say Ghenghis Khan was pretty overrated just because he spammed the most OP unit at the time that countered or defeated any army they met.
Alexander the Great, no doubt.What makes you say Alexander the Great? He never lost, conquered the Persian empire in an astounding amount of time and his victory at Gaugamela was a strategic masterpiece.
Stanisław August Poniatowski, most likely the worst king you can imagine
"Wisest" King that betrayed his own nation?Stanisław August Poniatowski, most likely the worst king you can imagine
Bullshit. Poniatowski was the wisest of Polish King's.
What makes you say Alexander the Great? He never lost, conquered the Persian empire in an astounding amount of time and his victory at Gaugamela was a strategic masterpiece.Alexander was an egoistic, greedy maniac with a comfortable situation. His father built the army and even made the actual plans, since he wanted to attack the persians as well before he was murdered - most historians say by order of Alexander himself. Besides inheriting the finest army in the world from his father, Alexander also ‘inherited’ Philip’s outstanding Chief-of-Staff, the 64-year-old Parmenion. In fact, Alexander seems to have behaved exactly as one would have expected a young cavalry commander to have behaved. For ever pursuing danger, heedless of risk, yet never in full command and control of the battle. Meanwhile, Parmenion, commanding the infantry phalanx was the true commander. It is also hardly creditable that Alexander ever gave a thought to the enormous logistical problems his army faced. Again, it is more that probable that Parmenion’s wealth of experience was the driving force in dealing with such mundane but vital matters.
Do you have any evidence that all of the strategy and logistical management were done by Parmenion?He was in charge of the whole logistics, even though he shared it with some other generals.
Yes he did create the gap, but it was Alexander who exploited said gap. You must understand that one man can not control a whole battle. There are many times when people like Napoleon relied on his Marshalls to aid him in battle. That doesn’t take away the victory from him it’s just simply impossible for one person to do it all. We don’t know what conversations were had between Parmenion and Alexander. Perhaps Alexander had ordered him to mange logistics in a certain way or had specifically deployed his army hoping that Parmenion would draw in much of the Persian army so Alexander could exploit that fact. A great general uses the resources at his disposal, including the talented men under his command.
It's important to remember Alexander the Great couldn't conquer India which shows how poor of a leader he was when it comes to morale/leading troops. George Washington and leaders like him understood how to make their soldiers go on past their breaking point (Valley Forge). Honestly if Washington or Patton was in charge of Alexander's army in 326 BC there is no doubt in my mind India would be speaking Greek even today.The situation for Washington and Alexander was completely different. Alexander had been campaigning for years far from home whilst Washington was fighting a war close to the hearts of his men on home soil.
Patton is a general from a different era and a different war, you’re just talking out of your arse saying he could have gone further when you have no facts to back it up because the suggestion is ludicrous. Alexander has been campaigning for years far away from home, it’s kind of amazing he kept his army going for as long as he did.Not to mention he dealt with a near mutiny on several occasions after Hydaspes. The Macedonians were exhausted after a decade long, constant campaign pushing east and all they wanted to do was go home. Alexander only gave in once he realized just how angry his troops were, and not to mention the thousands of Indians that were waiting for him after his victory against Porus. Alex would have stood no chance against them. I'd rather not start a what if scenario in detail, but Alexander should have halted his advance after the subjugation of Bactria and consolidated his power back home, as Antipater began to fiddle with the political scene in his favor.
I would also say Erwin Rommel is very overrated in part due to the "clean wehrmacht" myth that gets floated around every so often on historical forums. He got utterly humiliated at El Alamein and Tobruk. Even at Bir Hakeim he was held up by a much smaller force of free french soldiers and let us not forget his blunder at D-Day.He was possibly held in high regard so that whenever Allied generals lost to him, they had a semi-viable excuse that they went against Rommel, a tactical "genius", even though his record says otherwise. I'm not entirely sure though, there are a variety of factors as to why Rommel is praised.
Patton is a general from a different era and a different war, you’re just talking out of your arse saying he could have gone further when you have no facts to back it up because the suggestion is ludicrous. Alexander has been campaigning for years far away from home, it’s kind of amazing he kept his army going for as long as he did.In India only a 1/6 of his army was still macedonian, most were mercenaries and persians.
That doesn’t change the fact that he had fought a long hard campaign in foreign lands...
The difference being that Wellington wasn't the best general of his time and didn't really win a stunning victory on the Peninsula in the way that Alexander did.That doesn’t change the fact that he had fought a long hard campaign in foreign lands...
Wich also did Wellington on the Peninsula (ok he got local allies) and in India (I think he saw the battle of Assaye and not Waterloo as his masterpiece)
17e_Col_Augustin_Friant
18e_Col_John_Price17e_Col_Augustin_Friant
haha we will agree to disagree on historical fact pal, lets try to keep this thread on topic.
I would also put Michiel de Ruyter in this category as being massively overrated.
18e_Col_John_Price
J.F Kennedy
PicassoAh yes the great leader Picasso
Karl Marx :P
I like how people credit France entirely for the American victory and don't mention Steuben at allNobody says that France won it for America but in the same way America won it with massive help from France. There’s no shame in that. It’s just fact.
Try telling that to the rest of the patriotic retards that plague every barbecue and gun show. This country is legit retarded when it comes to warfare.I like how people credit France entirely for the American victory and don't mention Steuben at allNobody says that France won it for America but in the same way America won it with massive help from France. There’s no shame in that. It’s just fact.
Probably Erwin Rommel even though he did decent in africa he got btfo in france so thats why i think he is over rated
Oh hello fellow KoJ veteranQuoteProbably Erwin Rommel even though he did decent in africa he got btfo in france so thats why i think he is over rated
I dont understand why people seem to think rommel was overrated. He did outstandingly well in both campaigns considering the circumstances. The question isn't whether generals lost or won battles or wars, but if they were good. Therefore in my opinion a general who can still maintain a tactical edge on a superior enemy force (africa campaign) and conduct good defensive actions and rear-guard engagements (normandy campaign) should not be said to be overrated. He did well with what he was given, i doubt the same can be said with regards allied generals (not soviets)
Oh hello fellow KoJ veteran
QuoteProbably Erwin Rommel even though he did decent in africa he got btfo in france so thats why i think he is over rated
I dont understand why people seem to think rommel was overrated. He did outstandingly well in both campaigns considering the circumstances. The question isn't whether generals lost or won battles or wars, but if they were good. Therefore in my opinion a general who can still maintain a tactical edge on a superior enemy force (africa campaign) and conduct good defensive actions and rear-guard engagements (normandy campaign) should not be said to be overrated. He did well with what he was given, i doubt the same can be said with regards allied generals (not soviets)
No Patton was arrogant and selfish, pretty much only wanted wins for himself and was absolute shit at cooperating with airpower and other army Generals... American Generals were extremely petty in their feuds amongst themselves... their personal opinion dominated their cooperation and professional mindset towards other allied Generals... Germans had these petty feuds too, but were much more professional about it, especially 3-star and 4-star generals amongst themselves... The germans had the biggest fights with OKW, OKH, OBW, etc etc.
From Rommel himself:
“In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience, but it brought rich dividends. Even at that time, the American generals showed themselves to be very advanced in their tactical handling of their forces, although we had to wait until the Patton Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare.”
15th_YR_Cpt_Gi and 15th_YR_SjtMaj_Irish :)Report you will be demote Rikkito ;)
This man flourished in violence, he loved the thrill of it, and would have had his people engage in a state of perpetual warfare had he be given the chance to
Because the Macedonians would have wussed out within half a decade, probably causing an even bigger civil war than the one Alexander the not-so-great left after his early demise. Even they weren't that bloodthirsty.This man flourished in violence, he loved the thrill of it, and would have had his people engage in a state of perpetual warfare had he be given the chance to
Sounds like a hell of a guy, what’s the problem?
Because the Macedonians would have wussed out within half a decade, probably causing an even bigger civil war than the one Alexander the not-so-great left after his early demise. Even they weren't that bloodthirsty.This man flourished in violence, he loved the thrill of it, and would have had his people engage in a state of perpetual warfare had he be given the chance to
Sounds like a hell of a guy, what’s the problem?
I was referencing their unwillingness to go on invading other neighboring states (Carthage, Arabian Kingdoms, the Samnites, etc...), instead of fighting over what they already had. Given Alexander’s failure to plan ahead, the Diadochi conflict was inevitable. The remaining Macedonians were far more content with killing each other over what was already gained, rather than wage war against a a whole new host of enemies they had no idea how to fight.Because the Macedonians would have wussed out within half a decade, probably causing an even bigger civil war than the one Alexander the not-so-great left after his early demise. Even they weren't that bloodthirsty.This man flourished in violence, he loved the thrill of it, and would have had his people engage in a state of perpetual warfare had he be given the chance to
Sounds like a hell of a guy, what’s the problem?
Where is this "wussed out" coming from? The Wars of the Diadochi spanned decades. With a few breaks the Macedonians could fight far longer than 5 years. Unless you are referring to Alexander's possible defeat upon invading Qin or Chu China?
I was referencing their unwillingness to go on invading other neighboring states (Carthage, Arabian Kingdoms, the Samnites, etc...), instead of fighting over what they already had. Given Alexander’s failure to plan ahead, the Diadochi conflict was inevitable. The remaining Macedonians were far more content with killing each other over what was already gained, rather than wage war against a a whole new host of enemies they had no idea how to fight.Because the Macedonians would have wussed out within half a decade, probably causing an even bigger civil war than the one Alexander the not-so-great left after his early demise. Even they weren't that bloodthirsty.This man flourished in violence, he loved the thrill of it, and would have had his people engage in a state of perpetual warfare had he be given the chance to
Sounds like a hell of a guy, what’s the problem?
Where is this "wussed out" coming from? The Wars of the Diadochi spanned decades. With a few breaks the Macedonians could fight far longer than 5 years. Unless you are referring to Alexander's possible defeat upon invading Qin or Chu China?
If they had pushed on after conquering Porus, the Manda empire would have eventually intercepted and probably crushed them. On top of that, a sizable portion of Alexander’s army was filled with inexperienced Persian and Bactrian auxiliaries at this point, which few of the core phalangites, hypaspists, and companions were happy with. If they hadn’t revolted at the Beas River, inner turmoil and the nearby Indian kingdoms would have finished them off instead. It was a no-win scenario.
I fail to visualize, after 12 years of endless combat, a situation in which the Macedonians would be fully willing to go on campaign unless it was in defense of their own territory. These guys weren’t the fucking Mongols, they just wanted to go home.
Despite this, he still managed to act like big ol’ whiny bitch by having his army then march through an inhospitable wasteland that killed a good chunk of whatever was left of that sad excuse for an army.
IMO, celebrating Alexander, along with the figures related to him in ideology, should be considered a detriment to society.
The premise that the Macedonians were more content to kill each other rather than conquer new territories only becomes relevant in the aftermath of Alexander's death. Had he survived, it is likely that campaigns would have resumed within two years of the army's mutiny at Beas. Alexander was in the process of planning the invasion of Arabia when he was stricken with fever. Arrian's Anabasis of Alexander mentions the plans thusly:
Therefore he thought himself quite worthy to be considered by the Arabs as a third god, since he had performed deeds by no means inferior to those of Dionysus. If then he could conquer the Arabs, he intended to grant them the privilege of conducting their government according to their own customs, as he had already done to the Indians. The fertility of the land was a secret inducement to him to invade it; because he heard that the people obtained cassia from the lakes, and myrrh and frankincense from the trees; that cinnamon was cut from the shrubs, and that the meadows produce spikenard without any cultivation.[2] As to the size of the country, he was informed that the seaboard of Arabia was not less in extent than that of India; that near it lie many islands; that in all parts of the country there were harbours [sufficiently] commodious to provide anchorage for his fleet, and that it supplied sites for founding cities, which would become flourishing.
Alexander knew that some Macedonians would be reluctant to resume campaigning and that is why he pursued without delay the advancement of careers of Persians in the ranks, conveying Macedonian titles upon them and integrating Persian units more fully into his army. Alexander went so far as to establish a mass-marrying ceremony between Macedonian and Persian families to unify the two cultures and worked tirelessly to close the gap between Hellenic and Persian identities.
Insofar as Alexander's alleged failure to plan ahead accordingly, Alexander with the aid of his generals was quite capable of planning for without logistical expertise there would be no empire for him to administer. Alexander was also not inept at administrative affairs, for he admired Cyrus not simply for his military prowess but also for his ability to conduct affairs of state. If you are referring to the lack of apparent successors upon his death aside from his mentally disabled half-brother Arrhidaeus, this is likely due to the relatively commonplace practice of killing rivals. In empires such as Alexanders one is presented with a quandary. Any who may lay claim upon the title successor or he who is so inclined in military matters to be considered second in command may also at leisure depose his commanding officer and assume his commander's title for himself. Ottoman princes killing each other for the title of Sultan comes to mind. In a looser and more NW-friendly example, the coup of Nappy in the 45e by capable leaders.
With regards to Alexander's possible defeat at the hands of the (I'm assuming you meant the Nanda Empire of Magadha?) I agree it is likely that without sufficient rest and regrouping Alexander's forces would have been crushed by the Indians. For Plutarch writes:
As for the Macedonians, however, their struggle with Porus blunted their courage and stayed their further advance into India. For having had all they could do to repulse an enemy who mustered only twenty thousand infantry and two thousand horse, they violently opposed Alexander when he insisted on crossing the river Ganges also, the width of which, as they learned, was thirty-two furlongs, its depth a hundred fathoms, while its banks on the further side were covered with multitudes of men-at-arms and horsemen and elephants. For they were told that the kings of the Ganderites and Praesii were awaiting them with eighty thousand horsemen, two hundred thousand footmen, eight thousand chariots, and six thousand war elephants.
Alexander's army, exhausted by more than a decade of campaigning, likely could not have succeeded against such formidable odds. That being said, the integration of Persian units into Alexander's army is a moot point. Although initially unhappy with the mixing of units, Alexander worked tirelessly to smooth relationships between the two groups and Alexander's Macedonian troops begged him for forgiveness, which he accepted with the hosting of a sizeable banquet. This was followed by the aforementioned mass-marriage ceremony.
Apropos your earlier post, however, specifically:Despite this, he still managed to act like big ol’ whiny bitch by having his army then march through an inhospitable wasteland that killed a good chunk of whatever was left of that sad excuse for an army.
If you are referring to the opinion that Alexander's march through the desert was motivated by revenge, as popularized by the historian Peter Green in his 1970 book Alexander the Great, his exact intentions are hotly debated by historians today. Many argue that Alexander's motivations were logical and not out of malice aforethought. His march south along the Indus allowed supplies to be conveyed to his troops more easily and allowed him to establish a defensible border; the downside of course being that upon the termination of this route his army was forced to march through desert. In this Alexander knew he needed water, and he and his advisers designed a cunning plan whereby the navy, operating on the assumption winds and rains would be in their favor due to Indian reports in the region, would supply the troops from the shore and the infantry would make advances into the desert to dig wells for water. His fleet, however, delayed by inclement weather, was unable to fulfill their side of the plan, and Alexander's army soon began to succumb to thirst. Even without the navy at his disposal, however, Alexander's plans did not go completely astray- the wells did indeed fill with spring rains, however by fall the wells were dry and Alexander's men were again thirsty. Yet even in these situations Alexander was not without water. When his men camped in a dry riverbed, the river unexpectedly flooded, tragically and ironically leading to the drowning of many men in a place so parched. The soldiers, according to Strabo, "plunged into the water in their armour, and continued drinking until they were drowned; when swollen after death they floated, and corrupted the shallow water of the cisterns." Alexander lost perhaps one third of his army in the desert of Gadrosia, but even with this series of setbacks he managed to get the rest home.
Moreover, your later statement:IMO, celebrating Alexander, along with the figures related to him in ideology, should be considered a detriment to society.
Intrigues me. Should it be considered a detriment to society that Hellenistic culture spread throughout the earth as a result of Alexander's admittedly brutal reign? That an entirely new perspective emerged and blossomed, in the wake of Alexander's death, in the fields of art, architecture, theatre, literature, exploration, mathematics, and the sciences? That Euclidian Geometry and even the works of Archimedes were heavily influenced by the actions of a thirty-two year old from Macedon? If so, then let it be a detriment, but let it be one that I find most fascinating and mentally stimulating. Indeed, it can be no better stated than in the eulogy of the man whose actions changed the history of the western world more than any before him:
Whoever therefore reproaches Alexander as a bad man, let him do so; but let him first not only bring before his mind all his actions deserving reproach, but also gather into one view all his deeds of every kind. Then, indeed, let him reflect who he is himself, and what kind of fortune he has experienced; and then consider who that man was whom he reproaches as bad, and to what a height of human success he attained, becoming without any dispute king of both continents, and reaching every place by his fame; while he himself who reproaches him is of smaller account, spending his labour on petty objects, which, however, he does not succeed in effecting, petty as they are. For my own part, I think there was at that time no race of men, no city, nor even a single individual to whom Alexander's name and fame had not penetrated.
The debate on whether Alexander performed the march out of logistics or malevolence is a good reason to reject solid consensus, but I will point towards his previous actions as possible evidence to support the latter conclusion. It is stated in Arrian's Anabasis the following:
On arriving at Opis,note Alexander called together the Macedonians and declared that he was discharging from the campaign and sending back to their country those who were unfit for service because of age or wounds suffered. The presents he would give would make them an object of even greater envy at home and would encourage the other Macedonians to take part in the same dangers and hardships. Alexander spoke these words with the clear intention of pleasing the Macedonians, but they felt Alexander now despised them and regarded them as completely unfit for service. It was not unreasonable for them to take exception to Alexander's words, and they had had many grievances throughout the expedition. There was the recurring annoyance of Alexander's Persian dress which pointed in the same direction, and the training of the barbarian "Successors" in the Macedonian style of warfare,note and the introduction of foreign cavalry into the squadrons of the Companions. They could not keep quiet any longer, but all shouted to Alexander to discharge them from service and take his father on the expedition (by this insult they meant Ammon).
When Alexander heard this - he was now rather more quick-tempered and eastern flattery had made him become arrogant towards the Macedonians - he leaped from the platform with the leaders around him and ordered the arrest of the most conspicuous troublemakers, indicating to the hypaspists the men for arrest, thirteen in all. He ordered them to be led off for execution, and when a terrified silence had fallen on the others he ascended the platform again and spoke as follows,
"Macedonians, my speech will not be aimed at stopping your urge to return home; as far as I am concerned you may go where you like. But I want you to realize on departing what I have done for you, and what you have done for me. Let me begin, as is right, with my father Philip. He found you wandering about without resources, many of you clothed in sheepskins and pasturing small flocks in the mountains, defending them with difficulty against the Illyrians, Triballians and neighboring Thracians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of sheepskins, brought you down from the mountains to the plains, and made you a match in war for the neighboring barbarians, owing your safety to your own bravery and no longer to reliance on your mountain strongholds. He made you city dwellers and civilized you with good laws and customs. Those barbarians who used to harrass you and plunder your property, he made you their leaders instead of their slaves and subjects. He annexed much of Thrace to Macedonia, seized the most favorable coastal towns and opened up the country to commerce, and enabled you to exploit your mines undisturbed. He made you governors of the Thessalians, before whom you used to die of fright, humbled the Phocians and so opened a broad and easy path into Greece in place of a narrow and difficult one. The Athenians and Thebans, who were permanently poised to attack Macedonia, he so humbled (and I was now helping him in this task) that instead of you paying tribute to the Athenians and being under the sway of the Thebans, they now in turn had to seek their safety from us. He marched into the Peloponnese and settled matters there too. He was appointed commander-in-chief of all Greece for the campaign against the Persians, but preferred to assign the credit to all the Macedonians rather than just to himself. Such were the achievements of my father on your behalf; as you can see for yourselves, they are great, and yet small in comparison with my own. I inherited from my father a few gold and silver cups, and less than 60 talents in the treasury; Philip had debts amounting to 500 talents, and I raised a loan of a further 800. I started from a country that could barely sustain you and immediately opened up the Hellespont for you, although the Persians then held the mastery of the sea. I defeated in a cavalry engagement the satraps of Darius and annexed to your rule the whole of Ionia and Aeolis, both Phrygias and Lydia, and took Miletus by storm. All the rest came over to our side spontaneously, and I made them yours for you to enjoy. All the wealth of Egypt and Cyrene, which I won without a fight, are now yours, Coele Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia are your possession, Babylonia and Bactria and Elam belong to you, you own the wealth of Lydia, the treasures of Persia, the riches of India, and the outer ocean. You are satraps, you are generals, you are captains. As for me, what do I have left from all these labors? Merely this purple cloak and a diadem."
They would begin their march west soon after, but one must ponder for a minute the ramifications of the ringleader's actions here. Alexander clearly had made clear to his troops what he had done for them, and obviously felt betrayed when they decided to mutiny. Under these circumstances and the perceived consequences, would it not be reasonable to assume Alexander acted more out of spite towards his men by marching across the Gedrosia, and leaned less on the idea of a sound logistical plan?